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I. INTRODUCTION
The medical malpractice liability relationship between hospitals, physicians, and
patients in Ohio underwent extensive surgery in Hannola v. City of Lakewood.I In
Hannola, the Courtof Appeals for Cuyahoga County cut away traditional boundaries
of respondeat superior, diagnosed agency by estoppel as a new theory of hospital
liability, and transplanted a higher independent duty of hospitals for physician
malpractice in emergency rooms. 2
This Case Comment addresses the impact of the Hannola decision on the medical
malpractice liability relationship between hospitals, physicians, and patients in Ohio.
The analysis will focus on the three theories of hospital liability recognized by the
Hannola court: respondeat superior, agency by estoppel, and independent duty. The
appropriateness of these alternative theories will be discussed in relationship to past
Ohio Supreme Court decisions and present hospital-physician-patient relationships.
In Hannola, Liisa Hannola, as executrix of her decedent husband's estate, sued
Lakewood Hospital, the city of Lakewood, Milton J. MacKay M.D., and the West
Shore Medical Care Foundation (West Shore), alleging that Paavo Hannola died as
a result of medical malpractice in the emergency room.3 The hospital and the city both
claimed that the hospital emergency room was operated by West Shore under contract
with the hospital and, therefore, any acts of malpractice were the acts of independent
contractors. 4 Specifically, the defendants argued the following:
That physicians practice medicine; that the hospital did not control and had no right to control
the care and treatment provided to Paavo Hannola by Dr. MacKay; and that Dr. MacKay and
West Shore Medical Care Foundation, which hired the physicians for the hospital emergency
room, were independent contractors for whose acts the hospital was not liable. 5
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment for Lakewood
Hospital and the city of Lakewood, based on the arguments that the hospital did not
practice medicine and did not undertake to treat Paavo Hannola. 6
Two issues were raised by Liisa Hannola on appeal. First, did the trial court err
in granting summary judgment when material facts were at issue as to whether
Lakewood Hospital and the city of Lakewood controlled or had the right to control
1. 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
2. Id. at 61, 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1188, 1192.
3. Id. at 62, 426 N.E.2d at 1188. The specific events that occurred in the emergency room are not recited in the
record.
4. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 62, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1188 (1980). See infra note 9.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 62-63, 426 N.E.2d at 1188.
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Dr. MacKay and West Shore, and when there was a clear issue as to the hospital's
independent duty to Hannola to prevent the physician's malpractice. 7 Second, did the
trial court err in granting summary judgment when an issue of material fact existed
as to whether Liisa and Paavo Hannola were induced to rely on the appearance that
Dr. MacKay was an agent of Lakewood Hospital.8
In response to these two issues, the Hannola court stated that "[t]he essential
question for our consideration is whether a hospital may insulate itself by contractual
arrangement from liability for acts of medical malpractice committed in an emer-
gency room upon its premises." 9 The court stated that a hospital may not so insulate
itself1 o and held that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. 1
Concerning the first issue, the court held that Liisa Hannola presented "enough
facts to raise an issue as to whether Dr. MacKay was under the control of the hospital
to justify the imposition of liability upon the hospital under the doctrine of respondeat
superior."12 The court also explained that hospitals have a duty to prevent physician
malpractice, at least to the extent that the hospital establishes procedures for the
granting of staff privileges and for the review of those privileges.13 The court further
admonished that "a hospital may well have [a] more specific and precise independent
duty in the emergency room than in other parts of the hospital to monitor the treatment
procedures and medical care provided patients." 14
Regarding the second issue, whether Liisa Hannola relied on Dr. MacKay's
appearance as an agent of the hospital, the court held that there existed issues of
material fact. 15 The court specifically held that:
when an institution purporting to be a full-service hospital makes emergency room treatment
available to serve the public, the hospital will be estopped to deny that the physicians and
other medical personnel on duty providing treatment are its agents. Regardless of any
contractual arrangements with so-called independent contractors, the hospital will be liable
to the injured patient for the acts of malpractice committed in its emergency room, assuming
proximate cause and damage are present.' 6
In summary, the Hannola court recognized hospital liability for physician
malpractice under three theories: the traditional respondeat superior doctrine and the
7. Id. at 63, 426 N.E.2d at 1189.
8. Id.
9. Id. The contractual relationship was described by the Hannola court as follows:
Lakewood Hospital had an agreement with West Shore Medical Care Foundation whereby the Foundation hired
physicians and provided all the services of physicians for the emergency room of the hospital. The agreement
also contained a provision that the hospital shall not be liable for injury or damages to any person by reason of
any acts or omissions of physicians employed by the Foundation. . . .The Foundation billed patients directly
for professional services rendered by physicians employed by the Foundation.
Id. at 64, 426 N.E.2d at 1189.
10. Id. at 66, 426 N.E.2d at 1190.
11. Id. at 70, 426 N.E.2d at 1193.
12. Id. at 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 67, 426 N.E.2d at 1191.
16. Id. at 65-66, 67, 426 N.E.2d at 1190 (emphasis added).
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new theories of agency by estoppel and independent duty.1 7 Because of this
expansive approach, the Hannola decision removes important barriers to hospital
liability for physician malpractice.
II. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The maxim respondeat superior means "let the master answer." 18 Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the terms master, servant, and independent
contractor are carefully defined:
A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who
controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of
the service.
A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs and whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to
control by the master.
An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for
him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an
agent.' 9
In certain circumstances, a master is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant; a
principal is liable for the wrongful acts of his agent. 20 This section of the Case
Comment discusses the history of the application of the respondeat superior doctrine
to hospital liability in Ohio.
The Hannola court was not the first Ohio court to consider the applicability of
the respondeat superior doctrine to hospitals. In 1911, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association2t refused to extend the rule of respondeat
superior to hold a nonprofit hospital liable for the alleged negligence of an operating
room nurse who, despite a duty to account for sponges, left a sponge in a patient's
body. 22 The court explained as follows:
to extend the rule [of respondeat superior] to masters different from others and who do not
come within its reason . . . is not justified. Public policy should and does encourage
17. Id. at 65-66, 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1190, 1192.
18. BtAcK's LAw Dicno.4ARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
19. RmATr ET (SEco.-D) OF AGENcy § 2 (1958).
20. REsTATEaMN (SEcoN-D) or AGeNcY § 219 (1958).
§ 219 When Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment,
unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. See infra note 47.
21. 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
22. Id. at 91, 103, 96 N.E. at 1089, 1092.
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enterprises with the aims and purposes of defendant [non-profit hospital] and requires that
they should be exempted from the operation of the rule.23
Throughout the years after the Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association
decision, the rule granting full immunity to charitable hospitals became a rule of
partial immunity. In 1922, the court in Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and
Hospital,24 allowed recovery against a non-profit hospital for negligence in failing to
use ordinary care in selecting its servants.25 In 1930, the court in Sisters of Charity
of Cincinnati v. Duvelius,26 allowed recovery against a non-profit hospital for a
hospital elevator operator's negligence to an individual who was not a patient.27
Finally, in 1956, the Ohio Supreme Court in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital28 held
that "a corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose the maintenance and
operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.., liable for
the torts of its servants .... "29 The Avellone decision marked the end of the concept
of charitable immunity for non-profit hospitals in Ohio.30
The Avellone case involved the alleged negligence of a hospital in allowing a
patient to twice fall out of bed. 31 According to the Avellone court the prior
justifications for hospital immunity were premised upon public policy reasons which
were no longer relevant:
What we do find with regard to this aspect [public policy] is that the availability of liability
insurance and the existing power to purchase it with hospital funds, coupled with the
increased base of remuneration for services rendered and the efficient businesslike
management of modem hospitals, certainly tend to negate the argument that to hold the
hospital amenable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, to damages for injuries to
patients caused by the negligence of its servants would be such a detriment as to defeat the
charitable purpose for which it was organized and incorporated. 32
In concluding that a non-profit corporation, which has as its purpose the maintenance
and operation of a hospital, is liable for the torts of its servants under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the Avellone court cautioned: "[W]e are not deciding that
persons working in a hospital, such as doctors and nurses, under circumstances where
23. Id. at 103, 96 N.E. at 1092.
24. 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
25. Id. at 74, 135 N.E. at 291. The court stated that "every principle ofjustice requires that they [the hospital] use
care in the development and maintenance of the property and in the selection of servants who have the oversight of
patients." Id. at 73-74, 135 N.E. at 291.
26. 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
27. Id. at 57-61, 173 N.E. 739-40. The injured non-patient was a nurse employed by a patient.
28. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
29. Id. at 477, 135 N.E.2d at 417.
30. The concept of charitable immunity of non-profit hospitals in Ohio was judicially recognized in Taylor v.
Protestant Hosp. Ass'n., 85 Ohio St. 90, 103, 96 N.E. 1089, 1092 (1911). The rule for immunity of charitable
associations was first recognized in the United States in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
For a discussion regarding the U.S. adoption of charitable immunity, an English concept, that had been reversed in
England prior to its adoption in the U.S. see Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
31. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410, 410-11 (1956).
32. Id. at 475, 135 N.E.2d at 415. The Avellone court stated that the discussion did not address imposing liability
where none previously existed, but rather, addressed the public policy that in the past allowed non-profit hospital
immunity from a pre-existent liability under respondeat superior. Id.
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the hospital has no authority or right of control over them, can bind the hospital by
their negligent actions.'33
In 1960, the Ohio Supreme Court once more addressed the issue of the appli-
cability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to hospitals in Klema v. St. Elizabeth's
Hospital of Youngstown,34 but this time in relationship to physician malpractice. The
Klema court reaffirmed the Avellone decision that non-profit corporations could be
found liable for the negligence of employees under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.35 Specifically, the court held that a defendant hospital may be held liable for the
negligent acts of an anesthesiologist employed by the hospital as a resident physician. 36
Although the Klema court emphasized that hospitals could be liable for the
malpractice of such a physician, it specifically reserved the same question that was
unresolved in Avellone: Whether "persons working in a hospital, such as doctors and
nurses, under circumstances where the hospital has no authority or right of control
over them, can bind the hospital by their negligent actions."37 The Klema court,
however, did elucidate a test for determining a hospital's liability under the doctrine
of respondeat superior:
The test should be, simply, was the act done in the scope and course of the employee's
duties. Obviously, such a test will, so far as a hospital is concerned, relieve from, or subject
to, liability in exactly the same manner and according to the same rules as any other
employer is relieved or subjected.38
Thus, the Klema and Avellone decisions provided the background for the
Hannola court's expansion of liability under the respondeat superior doctrine. 39 In
applying the doctrine, the Hannola court first distinguished the relationship of
principal and agent, or master and servant, from the relationship of employer and
independent contractor by the following test:
Did the employer retain control of, or the right to control, the mode and manner of doing
the work contracted for? If he did, the relationship is that of principal and agent or master
and servant. If he did not but is interested merely in the ultimate result to be accomplished,
the relationship is that of employer and independent contractor. 40
33. Id. at 478, 135 N.E.2d at 417.
34. 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960).
35. Id. at 519, 525, 166 N.E.2d at 766-67, 770.
36. Id. at 520, 525-27, 166 N.E.2d at 767, 770-71. In Klema, the plaintiffbrought a wrongful death action against
the defendant hospital alleging negligence on the part of the anesthesiologist for inadequately administering anesthesia to
the patient. Id. at 519-20, 166 N.E.2d at 767. The decedent was admitted to the hospital for the purpose of undergoing
an operation for a perirectal abscess and subsequently died four days after the operation. Id. The anesthesiologist was not
licensed to practice medicine in Ohio but was licensed to practice medicine in Italy. He was first employed by the
defendant hospital as an intern and then as a resident in anesthesia on the staff of the defendant hospital. The court noted
the following:
[Slince the anesthetist was not licensed as a physician in Ohio . . . it would be possible to consider him as any
other nonmedical employee. . . .However, . . . we prefer to consider the anesthetist as if he were a physician
licensed to practice medicine in Ohio and on the staff of the hospital as a resident physician.
Id. at 520, 135 N.E.2d at 767.
37. Id. at 525-26, 166 N.E.2d at 770 (quoting Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467,478, 135 N.E.2d
410, 417 (1956)).
38. Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 527, 166 N.E.2d 765, 771 (1960).
39. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 68-69, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (1980).
40. Id. at 67-68,426 N.E.2d at 1191 (emphasis added) (quoting Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 295, 126
N.E.2d 597, 599 (1955)).
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The Hannola court then rejected the defendants' argument for a narrow interpretation
of control focused on authority over diagnosis and treatment of patients, and accepted
plaintiff's broader interpretation of control focused on authority over personnel
management and patient care policies. 4 1
Applying this broad interpretation of control to the agreement between the
hospital and West Shore, the court concluded that the hospital did have the right to
control the mode and manner of the work performed in the emergency room. For
example, the court specifically pointed to a provision in the agreement requiring that
physicians employed by West Shore must apply for and obtain appointment as
members of the medical staff of Lakewood Hospital. 42 The staff privileges of the
West Shore physicians were revocable for cause on recommendation of the medical
staff of the hospital, subject to the appeals procedure in the bylaws of the medical
staff.43 The court viewed the hospital's power to dismiss the physicians for cause as
similar to an employer's right to fire an employee. 44 Assuming arguendo that
dismissing a physician and firing an employee are similar, this does not logically lead
to the court's conclusion that the hospital had a right to control the mode and manner
of the physician's work in the emergency room.
The court also viewed another provision in the agreement as creating a factual
question concerning the hospital's control over Dr. MacKay. This provision provided
that the board of trustees of West Shore, with the approval of the executive committee
of the medical staff, the administration, and the board of trustees of the hospital, may
establish matters of policy regarding patient care.45 After noting these provisions, the
Hannola court in essence held that staff privileges revocable by the hospital and the
cooperative agreement, in which the trustees of West Shore could establish matters
of patient care policy subject to approval of the hospital, raised a factual question of
control justifying liability under respondeat superior.46
The Hannola decision indicates the court's willingness to expand the doctrine of
respondeat superior by simply redefining control. Specifically, the doctrine was
expanded to include non-employee physicians with staff privileges, a group that
traditionally has been considered independent contractors as opposed to servants. 47
The court's broad interpretation of the control necessary to demonstrate the existence
of a respondeat superior relationship as control of personnel and patient care policy
reflects an attempt by the court to use a means to reach an end. The end reached is
hospital liability for non-employee physicians. The means is a rearranging of the law
to fit the intended result.
41. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 68, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (1980).
42. Id. at 68-69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
43. Id. at 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
44.Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See RmsTATemENr (SECOND) OF Aomcv § 223 (1958). The Restatement of Agency acknowledges that employed
house physicians or interns may be considered servants of the hospital in certain circumstances, but indicates that a
physician employed by a hospital is not normally considered a servant. Id. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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The power to grant and revoke staff privileges does not, as the Hannola court
suggests, establish that an employer-employee relationship has been created. 48 The
court assumes too much when it suggests that staff privileges give hospitals control
over physicians in a manner sufficient to justify liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Physicians who are members of a medical staff have "delin-
eated clinical privileges that allow them to provide patient care services independently
within the scope of their clinical privileges." 49 Moreover, "[t]he hospital provides
that each patient's general medical condition is the responsibility of a qualified
physician member of the medical staff." 50 The hospital does not have overall
responsibility: "The medical staff ... has overall responsiblity for the quality of the
professional services provided by individuals with clinical privileges." ' 51 Thus,
physicians control the development and delivery of the patient's medical care based
on their independent knowledge and professional responsiblity.
Furthermore, staff privileges that attempt to control, influence, or alter a
physician's plan of care would be an unauthorized practice of medicine under state
law.5 2 A patient should be fearful of hospitals that violate state law by purporting to
control physicians and thereby practice medicine without authorization.
It is equally difficult to find support for the court's opinion that a hospital can
control a physician based on an agreement in which a third party may assist in
establishing matters of policy subject to approval by the hospital. This type of
collaboration is not unique. The development of an institutional policy regarding
patient care requires input from health care professionals; otherwise, the policy would
not adequately or accurately reflect patient needs. Therefore, it is a common practice
of hospitals to use input from health care professionals in developing patient care
policy. 53 This cooperative effort does not indicate control of the physician by the
48. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. The granting of staff privileges is part of the hospital's accreditation
process.
49. JoINT CoWUss1o. os AccREarrA'nOs or Hosprrss, AccREDrrAION MaNu roR Hosrrrmis, 1986 101 (1985) (emphasis
added). See infra note 71.
50. Josrr Co.Nussio. os AcairrAmnos OF HosrrALs, AccRErrATo.N MANUAL FOR Hosrrrmis, 1986 xvi (1985) (emphasis
added). See infra note 71.
51. Jor Co.sussioN oN AccvamrrAmA4oF HosprrALs, AccREDrrAION MANUAL oR HosprALS, 1986 101 (1985) (emphasis
added). See infra note 71.
52. Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.41 (Page 1977).
No person shall practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches without a certificate from the state medical
board; no person shall advertise or announce himself as a practitioner of medicine or surgery, or any of its
branches, without a certificate from the board; no person not being licensed shall open or conduct an office or
other place for such practice without a certificate from the board; no person shall conduct an office in the name
of some person who has a certificate to practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches; and no person shall
practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches, after a certificate has been revoked, or, if suspended, during
the time of such suspension.
Id.
53. For example, at Riverside Methodist Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, there are interdepartmental standard policies
and procedures related to patient care. In addition, there are departmental policies and procedures related to patient care.
The following discussion is a generalized overview of the policy and procedure process. The interdepartmental standard
policies and procedures are developed, revised, and reviewed through a process in which appropriate departments (those
departments affected by the policies and procedures) provide input. The input from the departments may include all levels
of hospital personnel as well as input from both employee and non-employee physicians depending on the nature of the
policy or procedure and the need for the input. This input receives final review by a conmittee of vice presidents. The
departmental policies and procedures are developed within departments, but also utilize input from other departments and
physicians as needed.
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hospital, but rather, reflects a collaborative, interdisciplinary approach to patient care
policy.
III. AGENCY By ESTOPPEL
As if cutting away at the doctrine of respondeat superior is not enough, the
Hannola court diagnoses agency by estoppel, creating a new theory of hospital
liability for physician malpractice in Ohio. 54 Prior to Hannola, the doctrine of agency
by estoppel had not been applied to the hospital-physician relationship. The Ohio
Supreme Court had, however, previously applied the doctrine to commercial
settings. 55 In one commercial case, the supreme court explained that "[t]he doctrine
of agency by estoppel . . . rests upon the theory that one has been led to rely upon the
appearance of agency to his detriment. It is not applicable where there is no showing
of induced reliance upon an ostensible agency." 56
Having recognized agency by estoppel in commercial cases, 57 the Hannola court
concluded too easily that the doctrine of agency by estoppel can be applied to
hospitals and physicians in an emergency room setting:58
By calling itself a "hospital" and by being a full-service hospital including an
emergency room as part of its facilities, an institution makes a special statement to the public
when it opens its emergency room to provide emergency care for people. In essence, an
agency by estoppel is established by creating an effect: that is, the appearance that the
hospital's agents, not independent contractors, will provide medical care to those who enter
the hosptial. The patient relies upon this as a fact and he belives he is entering a full-service
hospital. 59
It is clear that a finding of agency by estoppel must rest on a determination of whether
the injured party relied on the appearance that the physician was an agent of the
hospital. 6o
The Hannola court concluded that there were issues of material fact about
whether the Hannolas relied on Dr. MacKay's appearance as an agent of the
hospital. 6' Specifically, the Hannola court identified the following circumstances as
pertinent in estopping the hospital from denying that Dr. MacKay, the emergency
Because of the profound impact on patient care, nursing policies and procedures will be used as an example of how
departmental policies and procedures involve physician input. Nursing policies and procedures are developed, revised,
and reviewed by committees comprised of all levels of nursing personnel. Based on the content of the policy, the
Associate Manager of Policy and Procedure in the Nursing Department routes the work of the committee to individuals
with specialty expertise to obtain their input. These individuals might include nurse specialists, physicians, legal counsel,
committees comprised of nurses and physicians, the medical council, and others. After this input is received, the policy
and procedure is reviewed by a director's council comprised of nursing directors and a hospital vice president to be either
accepted and issued or returned for more input. Telephone interview with Ms. Ilene Hand, R.N., Associate Manager of
Policy and Procedure, Nursing Department, Riverside Methodist Hospital (Feb. 7, 1986).
54. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
55. Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202-03 (1941); Johnson v. Wagner Provision
Co., 141 Ohio St. 584, 49 N.E.2d 925 (1943).
56. Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 141 Ohio St. 584, 584, 49 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1943).
57. Jd.at 584, 49 N.E.2d at 925. Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202 (1941).
58. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65-66, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
59. Id. at 64-65, 426 N.E.2d at 1190 (emphasis added).
60. Id. See infra note 65.
61. Id. at 67, 426 N.E.2d at 1191.
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room physican who treated Paavo Hannola in the hospital emergency room, was an
agent of the hospital: Hannola did not choose to go to the West Shore Medical
Foundation; Liisa Hannola took Paavo to the emergency room for emergency
treatment relying on Lakewood Hospital holding itself out as a hospital; and Liisa
took Paavo to Lakewood, relying on the hospital's excellent reputation. 62
The court's conclusions that these facts were sufficient to estop the hospital from
denying that Dr. MacKay was an agent of the hospital is based on too great an
assumption of knowledge regarding the hospital-physician-patient relationship. For
example, there is no empirical support for the statement that merely because a
hospital labels itself a hospital and is a full-service hospital with an emergency room,
that the public believes that the physicians who work within the hospital facilities are
the hospital's agents rather than independent contractors.
The Hannola court further suggests that it is necessary to estop hospitals from
denying liability for physician malpractice in an emergency room setting because a
patient in an emergency situation does not always have a meaningful choice of going
elsewhere for treatment. 63 However, in an emergency situation as identified in
Hannola, where no meaningful choice exists, no reliance exists, thereby precluding
the application of the agency by estoppel doctrine. Similarly, in situations where the
choice of hospital is made by emergency squad personnel, no reliance and no agency
by estoppel exists because the patient or family is not making a choice based on
reliance. 64 Without reliance, there is no agency by estoppel. 65
Even in those situations in which patients do exercise a meaningful choice,
courts should not automatically apply the doctrine of agency by estoppel to create
hospital liability because individuals choose hospitals for a variety of reasons. For
example, one study has demonstrated that for life-threatening problems, thirty-two
percent of individuals select a hospital based on which hospital is closest in terms of
both geographic distance and traffic patterns. 66 Twenty-two percent select a hospital
based on prior experience. 67 In those situations in which the choice is made based on
geographic distance and traffic patterns, neither reliance nor agency by estoppel
exists. In situations in which the choice is made on prior experience, the prior
62. Id. at 66, 426 N.E.2d at 1191. Additional facts, as stated by the court, were as follows: Lakewood Hospital
held itself out as a full-service hospital that included emergency room facilities; the public did not know and was not
effectively informed that the emergency room facilities were operated by an independent contractor and were no longer
considered as part of the hospital. Id. at 64, 426 N.E.2d at 1190. (The record does not explaln why Hannola had no
choice).
63. ld.at 65, 66, 426 N.E.2d at 1190.
64. For example, the unwritten policy of the City of Columbus, Fire Division regarding the squad and medic units
is as follows: In general, take patients to the nearest hospital; take heart patients with stable condition to the hospital where
their personal cardiologist admits patients; take dialysis patients to any hospital with a dialysis unit; take children to
Childrens Hospital; take patients with bums to Ohio State University Hospitals. Interview with Ms. Susie Barnes, R.N.,
Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic Instructor, City of Columbus, Division of Fire (Jan. 13, 1986).
65. Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 141 Ohio St. 584, 584, 49 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1943).
The doctrine of agency by estoppel, as it might be invoked by a plaintiff in a tort action, rests upon the theory
that one has been led to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment. It is not applicable where there
is no showing of induced reliance upon an ostensible agency.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. Confidential Co.sisNrry Ai-srnE SURvEv conducted by a metropolitan Columbus hospital (September 10,
1985).
67. Id.
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experience could include the patient's relationship with particular physicians as well
as with the hospital and, thus, the court could not automatically attribute the choice
to reliance on the hospital.
In general, the Hannola court glosses over the importance of physician influence
in choosing a hospital. Statistically, the physician selects the hospital in over half of
all cases (51%), with another twelve percent of hospital selection based on joint
decisions between the patient and physician. 68 Conversely, hospitals have little
influence over an individual's reasons for selecting a physician. In one study, the
three most frequently mentioned reasons for selecting a physician were as follows:
recommended by a friend or relative (40.6%); recommended by another physician
(14.5%); and convenience of location (6.5%).69 Among the least mentioned reasons
were: recommended by hospital (1.1%) and treated by member of hospital staff
(1.2%).70
The rationale of the Hannola court thus contradicts the past experience of
patients and discredits the patient-physician relationship. Many patients have
relationships with physicians that predate their emergency room admissions and are
aware that physicians use hospitals to admit patients when more than outpatient care
is required. There is no data to support that the use of an emergency room facility can
alter common understanding of the physician as an independent professional.
It is equally unclear that the granting of staff privileges can change this common
understanding. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (J.C.A.H.)
requires that a hospital have a medical staff.71 Physicians often have staff privileges
at several hospitals. This does not mean that their patients view them as employed by
these hospitals. In fact, whether a physician with staff privileges is employed by the
hospital, or is employed by a third party under a contractual basis with the hospital,
has little medical relevance to a patient. The bottom line is that patients rely on the
expertise of the physician, not on the status of the physician's employment. Hospitals
should not pay the penalty of liability for physician malpratice merely because they
follow established procedures for accreditation. 72
However, in furtherance of the court's conclusions that agency by estoppel is
created by a hospital representing itself as a hospital and by being a full-service
hospital with emergency room services, the Hannola court states that "sound public
policy demands that the full-service hospital not be permitted to contractually insulate
68. Id.
69. R. BLACKwELL & W. TALARzYK, CoNsu,.R Arnrusne TowAD HEATm CAPE AND Msoic.AL MmInmCncF 30 (1977).
70. Id.
71. Hospitals seeking accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) must meet
certain eligibility requirements in order to apply for a JCAH accreditation survey. These eligibility requirements include
the following:
The hospital has a governing body, medical staff, and a nursing service.
The hospital provides that each individual who has been granted clinical privileges by the governing body
practices only within the scope of privileges granted.
The hospital provides that each patient's general medical condition is the responsibility ofa qualified physician
member of the medical staff.
JOINT CONSUSSION ON AccREorrATION OF HosPrrAtLs, AccREorrAION MANUAL FOR Hos,'rrAs, 1986 xv, xvi (1985) (emphasis
added).
72. See supra note 71.
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itself from liability for acts of medical malpractice committed in its emergency
room.' 73 The reasons given by the court are that an emergency room is an integral
part of a full-service hospital, that hospitals should not pretend emergency rooms are
separate entities, and that emergencies are a time of high emotion in which patients
frequently have no chance to choose a hospital.74 Thus, this sound public policy is
merely a repetition of the court's reasons for concluding that agency by estoppel
should be established. 75
The Hannola court explains that its analysis is consistent with public expecta-
tions regarding emergency treatment, and relies on the following excerpt from a law
review article for support:
The image of modem hospitals as centers of medical practice of the highest quality is
understandably cultivated by the hospitals themselves .... [The hospital presents
itself] ... as a unified institution vital to community health, rather than as a mere physical
shell in which private physicians practice their profession.
Public outrage, and possibly even an effect on admissions at a typical hospital,
would surely follow a public announcement by the hospital that it regards all staff doctors
as completely independent professionals, conducts no supervision of their performance, and
takes no interest in their competence. The public assumes, correctly or not, that the hospital
exerts some measure of control over the medical activities taking place there.76
The wisdom of assuming that the public would be outraged because a hospital
regards all staff doctors as completely independent must be questioned. The
assumption could just as easily be set forth that the public would be outraged that
hospitals regarded staff doctors as under the hospital control. For example, a possible
concern might be that a hospital, in an effort to reduce costs, would try to prevent a
physician from implementing the best medical treatment plan.
As if creating an agency by estoppel doctrine for hospital liability is not severe
enough, the Hannola court states that the creation of agency by estoppel in the
hospital setting is "somewhat different" from creation in commercial settings. 77 The
court explains that in commercial settings public advertisements disclaiming agency
might insulate unwilling principals because people might act differently with the
knowledge that there was no actual agency. 78 The implication is that similar public
advertisements disclaiming agency would not insulate hospitals. Thus, the Hannola
court implies that it will allow a hospital no method of escaping from this restrictive
and potentially destructive doctrine. 79
The court justifies this "somewhat different" application of the doctrine by
stating that in a hospital setting in which a patient seeks medical treatment "without
a meaningful choice," the patient "will turn to his local hospital to provide it
73. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
74. Id. at 65, 426 N.E.2d at 1190.
75. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
76. Hannolav. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 66,426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190-91 (1980) (quoting Leonard,
Independent Duty Of A Hospital To Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15 Auz. L. REv. 953, 967 (1973)).
77. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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regardless of prior notice that the physicians are independent contractors. The patient
thinks of 'Lakewood Hospital' in his time of need, not the West Shore Medical Care
Foundation." 80 However, in a situation in which a patient has no meaningful choice,
he cannot logically be said to "think" of Lakewood and cannot be said to rely when
no choice in fact exists.
The Hannola court appears eager to relentlessly apply the doctrine of agency by
estoppel to hospitals, even though it might financially destroy hospitals. From 1970
to 1984, medical malpractice payments by hospital insurance companies skyrocketed
by 9000 percent from $211,000 to $18,000,000.81 The amount of the average award
escalated 900 percent from $4,100 in 1970 to $35,000 in 1984.82 As recently as 1981
there were no claims for more than $1,000,000, but since 1982 there has been an
increase in the number of claims greater than $1,000,000.83 In 1985 there was even
a $5,000,000 claim. 84 Correspondingly, premiums for malpractice insurance have
increased across the country. During the 1960's, premiums rose 950 percent for
surgeons, 541 percent for other physicians, and 262 percent for hospitals. 85
Perhaps the Hannola court's relentless application of the doctrine of agency by
estoppel to hospitals reflects a desire to tap a deeper pocket. Hospitals, however, do
not necessarily have deeper pockets. Hospitals cannot buy insurance at better rates
than physicians. 86 More importantly, hospitals are unable to obtain insurance
coverage for non-employee staff physicians, physicians under contract, and fee for
service physicians. 87 Thus, the court is holding hospitals liable for situations in which
the hospitals cannot protect themselves.
These staggering statistics require a more well-reasoned opinion by the court
than proferred for holding hospitals liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel.
Additionally, the erroneous assumption of knowledge regarding the hospital-
physician-patient relationship should not be the basis for establishing a new theory of
hospital liability.
80. Id.
81. Data obtained from a closed claim survey conducted by the Ohio Hospital Association. The survey represents
information from member hospitals of the Hospital Association, whose membership includes about 90% of the hospitals
in Ohio. The increase in the number of claims has only doubled, and therefore, cannot account for the 9000% increase
in the amount of payments. Telephone interview with Mr. Richard Sites, I.D., M.S., Director of Risk Management, Ohio
Hospital Association (Jan. 22, 1986).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. R. BtAcKwru. & W. TA.ARZYK, supra note 69, at 20.
86. Telephone interview with Mr. Richard Sites, J.D., M.S., Director of Risk Management, Ohio Hospital
Association (Jan. 22, 1986). Two insurance companies write insurance for hospitals in Ohio: Ohio Hospital Insurance
Company; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance. Id.
87. In general, premiums are based on the number of hospital beds and the number of outpatient visits with credits
or debits based on loss experience. In order to include employed physicians, hospitals must additionally pay 10-15% of
the premium rate. Employed physicians are considered to be physicians on the payroll subject to standard payroll
deductions. Any staff physicians, physicians under contract, and fee for service physicians are not covered. Despite this
non-coverage, courts may require hospitals to pay if physician coverage is not considered to be adequate. Information on
specific premium rates was not obtainable. Telephone interview with Ms. Karen McDonald, Senior Supervisor,
Underwriting Department, Ohio Hospital Insurance Company, Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 22, 1986).
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IV. INDEPENDENT DuTY
The Hannola court recognized, as a third theory of hospital liability, that a
hospital has an independent duty to prevent physician malpractice. 88 Prior to
Hannola, there had been no reference to this new duty by any Ohio or federal court.
The Hannola court cited two out-of-state cases89 to support the proposition that
"[a] hospital clearly does have a duty to prevent a physician's malpractice at least to
the extent that it establishes procedures for the granting of staff privileges and for the
review of these privileges." 90 An analysis of these two cases, however, does not
support the court's broad holding that hospitals have an independent duty to prevent
physician malpractice.
In Mitchell County Hospital Authority v. Joiner,9 1 the plaintiff sought to hold the
hospital liable under the "doctrine of independent negligence in permitting the
alleged negligent physician to practice his profession in the hospital, when his
incompetency [was] known. '"92 In Purcell v. Zimbelman93 the plaintiff's theory
against the hospital was as follows:
[T]he hospital had a duty to the public to allow the use of its facilities only by such
independent staff doctors as are professionally competent and who treat their patients in full
accordance with accepted and established medical practices, and that the hospital breached
its duty when it failed to take any action against [Dr.] Purcell when it knew, or should have
known, that he lacked the skill to treat the condition in question.-
The Mitchell and Purcell cases refer to a hospital's duty to protect the public
from physician malpractice when the incompetence of the physician is known or
should be known by the hospital.95 This narrow duty must be distinguished from the
overly broad duty to prevent physician malpractice created by the Hannola court.
Incompetency indicates a lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge a
required duty. 96 Malpractice indicates professional misconduct or unreasonable lack
of skill. 97 Since professional misconduct may be different from lack of skill or ability,
malpractice cannot automatically be equated with incompetence.
The record in the Mitchell case does not reveal what incompetency the hospital
was alleged to have known. 98 The Mitchell court did specifically state that "[i]f the
physician was incompetent and the [Hospital] Authority knew, or from information in
its possession such incompetency was apparent, then it cannot be said that the
88. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 69, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (1980).
89. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229
Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
90. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 69, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (1980).
91. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
92. Id. at 141, 189 S.E.2d at 413.
93. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
94. Id. at 80, 500 P.2d at 340 (emphasis added).
95. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140,141,189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972); Purcell v. Zimbelman,
18 Ariz. App. 75, 80, 500 P.2d 335, 340 (1972).
96. BLAcK's LAw DicnoARY 688 (5th ed. 1979).
97. Id. at 864.
98. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 141-43, 189 S.E.2d 412, 413-14 (1972).
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[Hospital] Authority acted in good faith and with reasonable care in permitting the
physician to become a member of its staff." 99
In Purcell, the physician defendant had a record of past lawsuits for medical
malpractice, several of which involved the same procedure that allegedly killed the
decedent. 100 The Purcell court held that the prior lawsuits were admissible evidence
to prove that the hospital had notice of the general competency of Dr. Purcell to
continue as a staff member of the hospital. 10 1
In summary, the Mitchell and Purcell cases involved staff physicians and the
allegations that the hospitals knew or should have known of the incompetence of the
physicians.' 0 2 By contrast, the Hannola case involved a physician hired by a third
party and no allegations by the plaintiff that the physician was incompetent or that the
hospital knew or should have known of his incompetence. 103
The basis of an independent duty of hospitals, if it is to be recognized at all, is
the duty to protect patients from incompetent physicians. The duty is not, as the
Hannola court suggests, a broad duty to protect patients from physician malpractice. 0 4
The Hannola court compounds its mistake by attempting to establish an even
higher independent duty for medical malpractice in emergency rooms. 105 The only
rationale given by the Hannola court for establishing this higher duty is "the unique
nature of an emergency room and the public's lack of meaningful choice in a dire
medical emergency .... "106
A court should not create a broad indepedent duty of hospitals to protect against
physician malpractice as casually as the court does in the Hannola case.10 7 The duty
in Hannola is based on an erroneous reading of the common law of other jurisdic-
tions 08 and on an overzealous attitude regarding hospital liability for emergency room
physicians.
V. THE HANNOLA COURT'S DISREGARD OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
COOPER DECISION
In its haste to create new avenues of hospital liability for physician malpractice,
the Hannola court dismissed, in a footnote, 0 9 Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 1 a prior
Ohio Supreme Court case ruling that is relevant to the issue at hand. In Cooper, the
plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the following defendants: The Sisters of
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., doing business as Good Samaritan Hospital; the Emer-
99. Id. at 143, 189 S.E.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
100. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 83-85, 500 P.2d 335, 343-45 (1972).
101. Id. at 84, 500 P.2d at 344.
102. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 141,189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972); Purcell v. Zimbelman,
18 Ariz. App. 75, 80, 500 P.2d 335, 340 (1972).
103. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 62, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1188 (1980).
104. Id. at 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192 (1980).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 141, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972). See Purcell
v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 80, 500 P.2d 335, 340 (1972). See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
109. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 69-70 n.2, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1192-93 n.2 (1980).
110. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
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gency Professional Service Group, a third party that had entered into an agreement with
the Good Samaritan Hospital to run its emergency room at the hospital; Richard
Weber, that group's director; and Dr. Hansen, the physician who treated the decedent
in the emergency room. "' The supreme court, affirming the judgment of both the trial
court and the court of appeals, granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on
the basis that the evidence of proximate cause was insufficient to submit to the jury. "12
More importantly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Sisters
of Charity would not be liable for any negligence of Dr. Hansen because he was an
employee of the Emergency Professional Service Group and was not under the
"control" of the hospital. 1 3 In affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court
stated that "the practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is not
sufficient to create an agency by estoppel .... Nowhere is 'induced reliance'
[present] ... as [is] required ... to establish such a relationship. "114
The Hannola court distinguished the Cooper case by a procedural comparison:
the Cooper case reached the Ohio Supreme Court on the granting of a motion for a
directed verdict. Hannola came to the court of appeals on the improper granting of
a pretrial motion for summary judgment wherein there remained significant issues of
fact to be determined on the questions of control, induced reliance, and the hospital's
independent duty of care." 5
The Hannola court also stated that the Cooper court had not considered the
relevant public policy issues:
These public policy issues include the hospital's special independent duty in the
emergency room on its premises and the problem of the full-service hospital and patients'
induced reliance on the reputation of the hospital with an emergency room on the premises.
Of course, we fully agree that the mere practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a
hospital is not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel.16
The Hannola court's decision provides two contradictory messages. "[T]he
mere practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is not sufficient to
create an agency by estoppel. '"117 However, the presence of an agreement with the
hospital to collaborate on patient care policy and the granting of staff privileges, both
of which apply to virtually all physicians who care for patients within hospitals, will
be sufficient to raise an issue about whether a hospital has enough control over a
physician to justify imposition of liability upon the hospital." 8 The Ohio Supreme
Court overruled a motion to certify the record in Hannola."9 Subsequently, the
parties reached a settlement.120
111. Id. at 245, 246, 272 N.E.2d at 100, 101.
112. Id. at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104-105.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 70 n.2, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 n.2 (1980).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
119. Id. at 61 n.1, 426 N.E.2d at 1187 n.1.
120. West Shore paid the plaintiff. The hospital did not pay. Telephone interview with Mr. Patrick J. Murphy, J.D.,
Jacobson, Maynard, Tusehman, Kalur, Co. L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 31, 1986). Mr. Murphy was a defense attorney
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VI. POST-HANNoLA DECISIONS
By invoking an "anything goes" attitude, the Hannola court has opened the
door for imposing liability on hospitals for physician malpractice in virtually every
possible circumstance. In 1984, in Stratso v. Song, 121 despite a trial court finding as
a matter of law that the anesthesiologists were independent contractors hired by a
third party, the Franklin County Court of Appeals of Ohio held that the evidence
permitted a jury to find the hospital liable for the alleged malpractice under either of
two theories: agency by estoppel or the existence of a non-delegable duty. 122
Regarding the first theory, the Stratso court remarked that agency by estoppel is
ordinarily a factual issue to be proved by evidence of induced reliance.' 23 "In the
medical-malpractice context, a physician's negligence is imputed to the hospital
where the patient relies, to his detriment, upon demonstrable indications that the
physician is an employee of the hospital."'124
According to the Stratso court, ample evidence existed of induced reliance and
of actual reliance on the representations by the hospital that it would provide the service
of anesthesia. 125 Specifically, the court stated that the patient did not have the same
opportunity to solicit information about the anesthesiologists' qualifications and rep-
utation as he would in choosing a surgeon or physician in private practice. 26 The
patient relied on the hospital to provide all operating-room services, other than surgery,
but including anesthesia.' 2 7 The "hospital... contracted with the physician group to
provide that service (anesthesia) which it, the hospital, had at least impliedly repre-
sented it would provide to the patient."' 128 The court stated that from the patient's
perspective the hospital and the anesthesiologist were not separate. t29
in the Hannola case. At the time of the case he was an attorney with Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland,
Ohio.
121. 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, 477 N.E.2d 1176 (1984).
122. Id. at 45, 477 N.E.2d at 1184-85.
The evidence indicated that the anesthesiologists involved in Frances Stratso's care were employed by Allied
Anesthesia Services, Inc., a physician corporation providing one hundred percent anesthesia coverage to
defendant hospital pursuant to a contract with the hospital. Concerning the relationship between the hospitals
and the employees of Allied Anesthesia Services, Dr. Hamelberg, Director of Critical Care at St. Anthony,
testified that: the hospital provides a job description for the Chief of Anesthesia Services; the Chief of
Anesthesia Services is responsible for implementation of the standards of the Joint Commission for the
Accreditation of Hospitals as they relate to anesthesia services; the Chief of Anesthesia Services develops
policies and procedures for anesthesia services; the other physician anesthesiologists work under the Chief of
Anesthesia Services; the Chief of Anesthesia Services is responsible to the Chief of Staff and the administration
of St. Anthony Hospital and reports to the Director of Critical Care, who is responsible for seeing that the Chief
of Anesthesia Services carries out his responsibilities; the hospital provides a job description for all physician
anesthesiologists; the physician anesthesiologists are expected to meet the demands of the surgery schedule at
the hospital; the job description requires a physician anesthesiologist to make pre-operative and post-operative
rounds and to be present at all times in the operating room; the physician anesthesiologist supervises nurse
anesthetists; and the physician anesthesiologist is jointly responsible to the Chief of Staff and to the
administration of St. Anthony Hospital.
Id.
123. Id. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1186.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 47-48, 477 N.E.2d at 1186-87.
126. Id. at 46, 477 N.E.2d at 1185.
127. Id. at 48, 477 N.E.2d at 1187.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 46, 477 N.E.2d at 1185.
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The court, however, may be making an erroneous assumption by stating that a
patient relies on a hospital to provide anesthesia. Indeed, it may be more true that
patients merely rely on the anesthesiologist, not the hospital, to provide anesthesia.
A patient is told that a physician will administer the anesthesia, and indeed, it will be
the anesthesiologist and not the hospital who makes a visit to the patient prior to
surgery. In addition, it is the physician and not the hospital who administers the
anesthesia to the patient. The court should not make hasty assumptions when more
empirical facts are needed to determine whether patients rely on a hospital's agent to
administer anesthesia.
Regarding the theory of a non-delegable duty, the court's rationale is unclear.
The Stratso court reiterates the rule of Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller:130
Where danger to others is likely to attend the doing of certain work unless care is
observed, the person having it to do is under a duty to see that it is done with reasonable care,
and cannot, by the employment of an independent contractor, relieve himself from liability
for injuries resulting to others from the negligence of the contractor or his servants.' 3'
Then, without further explanation, the court states that reasonable minds could
conclude that the hospital was liable for the negligence of the anesthesiologist and the
nurse anesthetist under the doctrine of respondeat superior.132
One year prior to Stratso, in another post-Hannola decision, Smith v. Timken
Mercy Medical Center, 133 a different result was reached by an appellate court. The
Court of Appeals for Stark County addressed the alternate claims of whether an
express principal-agent relationship existed between the defendant hospital and three
physicians, or whether the hospital was liable under an agency by estoppel theory. 134
The Smith court did not find respondeat superior or agency by estoppel to apply.135
In Smith, the decedent was admitted to the defendant hospital as a patient of
co-defendant Dr. Williams for diagnosis and treatment. 136 During hospitalization, the
patient was also treated by defendants Dr. Alasyali and Dr. Gesenhues. 137 All three
physicians had staff privileges and were governed by the hospital's constitution,
bylaws, policies, rules, and regulations. 138 The plaintiff claimed that the hospital had
a right to exercise control over these doctors with staff privileges because of the
Timken Mercy Medical Staff Constitution. 139 The plaintiff alleged that the negligence
of the defendants in diagnosis, care, and treatment resulted directly and proximately
in the decedent's death. 14 0
130. 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N.E.2d 360 (1936).
131. Stratso v. Song, 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, 48, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1187 (1984) (quoting Riehman Brothers Co. v.
Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 424, 3 N.E.2d 360, 360 (1936)).
132. Stratso v. Song, 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, 48, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1188 (1984).
133. Smith v. Timken Mercy Medical Center, No. CA-6006, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1983).
134. Id. at 2-3.
135. Id. at 4-5.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3-4.
140. Id. at 2.
[Plaintiff) argues that the hospital Board of Trustees has the final say on whether the physician is to be appointed
or reappointed to the staff and that the Board controls whether the doctor shall have reduced, suspended, or
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The Smith court, however, held that the hospital's constitution did not justify
"impos[ing] upon the hospital and the doctors admitted to practice there a
relationship of respondeat superior as relates to the diagnosis and treatment of
medical conditions of patients admitted to the hospital by the doctor." 141 Regarding
the alternate claim of agency by estoppel, the court did not find evidence to "support
the conclusion that the hospital held itself out to plaintiff's decedent as the provider
of such medical care, or by its conduct is somehow estopped from denying its
reponsibility as a principal. "142
The Smith court held that the case falls clearly within the holding in Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity that the practice of medicine is not enough to create an agency by
estoppel without a showing of induced reliance by the plaintiff. 143 The court further
elaborated that the Timken Mercy Medical Center did not do anything to create an
impression in the patient's mind that the doctor was the hospital's agent. 144 The Smith
court stated that Hannola was distinguishable.145 According to the Smith court, the
Hannola case did not present an issue of respondeat superior, but instead was
decided on ostensible agency (agency by estoppel) in which the hospital "held itself
out" to a patient who voluntarily appeared at the hospital and relied on the hospital's
reputation. 146
In a more recent case, Funk v. Hancock,147 the Court of Appeals, Twelfth
Appellate District, Fayette County, addressed the question of hospital liability for the
alleged malpractice of a physician called in as a consultant by the emergency room
physician. In Funk, the decedent was brought to the emergency room of the
defendant, Fayette County Memorial Hospital, by his mother for treatment of an
injury to his left arm.148 The decedent was treated by an emergency room physician
who diagnosed a fracture of the left forearm and who then called co-defendant Dr.
Hancock for consultation regarding the setting of the arm. 14 9 Dr. Hancock was a staff
physician on call at the emergency room. 150 The mother sued the hospital and Dr.
Hancock for medical malpractice as a result of "improper casting of a compound
fracture without debridement and appropriate follow-up observations and care." 151
terminated privileges; that the staff must comply with lawful standards, policies, and rules of the hospital; that
staff are governed by the principles of ethics promulgated by the staff and conforming to the Code of Catholic
Medical Ethics; that the staff provide for continuous care of patients and refrain from delegating the
responsibility for diagnosis or care to one not qualified to undertake the responsibility.
Id. at 3-4.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
144. Smith v. Timken Mercy Medical Center, No. CA-6006, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1983).
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id.
147. 26 Ohio App. 3d 107, 498 N.E.2d 490 (1985).
148. Id. at 107, 489 N.E.2d at 491.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 107-108,498 N.E.2d at 490-92. "Debridement" is defined as removal of all foreign material and aseptic
excision of all contaminated and devitalized tissue. B. Maniz & C. Kssms, Ern-Lors min DicnONARV OF MEDicIE A
NussiNG 295 (1983).
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The plaintiff's claims of hospital liability were premised on the legal theories of
joint venture, actual agency, and agency by estoppel.' 52 The court dismissed the
plaintiff's allegation of joint venture because the hospital and physicians did not have
a contract to carry out a single business adventure for their joint profit.' 53 The court
directed its attention to plaintiff's agency by estoppel argument "without discounting
the more remote possibility that an actual agency relationship might be proved to exist
as between Dr. Hancock and the hospital."'' 54 The court stated:
Although the Cooper and Hannola decisions reach opposite results as to whether the
respective hospitals involved should be relieved of further participation in suits against them,
both decisions reflect the same underlying philosophy: agency by estoppel is applicable to
cases involving physicians practicing in hospital emergency rooms, and if a hospital's
actions are such that emergency room patrons are encouraged to rely on a presumed agency
relationship between a treating physician and the hospital, the hospital may in fact be
estopped from denying such relationship.' 55
The court concluded that the evidence raised sufficient questions concerning the
hospital relationship to preclude the hospital's motion for summary judgment. 56
A review of Hannola and post-Hannola decisions reveals the depth of the new
expansion in hospital liability for physician malpractice. Hospitals have now been
held liable for malpractice of emergency room physicians hired by third parties under
theories of respondeat superior, agency by estoppel, and independent duty;' 5 7 for
malpractice of anesthesiologists hired by third parties under theories of agency by
estoppel and non-delegable duty;' 58 and for malpractice of staff physicians on call for
consultation in hospital emergency rooms.' 59 The trend however, is not without
opposition. One appellate court has held that merely because a physician has staff
privileges and is governed by a hospital constitution, no justification exists for
imposing a relationship of respondeat superior or for creating a relationship of
agency by estoppel. '60 Perhaps this confusion concerning the appropriate theories for
hospital liability in Ohio, and their proper application, will encourage the Ohio
Supreme Court to certify the record of future cases addressing these issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Hannola court's extensive surgery on the medical malpractice liability
relationship of hospitals, physicians, and patients in Ohio has set an unprecedented
standard for expanding hospital liability for physician malpractice. Since Hannola,
hospitals are liable for what they do not and cannot control, namely, the independent
152. Funk v. Hancock, 26 Ohio App. 3d 107, 109, 498 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1985).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 110, 498 N.E.2d at 494.
155. Id. at 111-12, 498 N.E.2d at 495.
156. Id. at 112, 498 N.E.2d at 495.
157. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65-66, 69, 426 N.E.2d 1188, 1190, 1192 (1980).
158. Stratso v. Song, 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, 45, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1185 (1984).
159. Funk v. Hancock, 26 Ohio App. 3d 107, 498 N.E.2d 490 (1985).
160. Smith v. Timken Mercy Medical Center, No. CA-6006, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1983).
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medical decisions and actions of physicians that result in malpractice.161 As a result,
a serious postoperative complication has occurred. The courts have given hospitals
the authority to practice medicine-a role the law disallows. 62
The cutting away of the traditional boundaries of respondeat superior, the
transplantation of an independent duty, and the diagnosis of agency by estoppel all
hold hospitals liable for physician malpractice. Physicians shoulder the responsibility
for sound patient care within their private offices and should be given the dignity of
doing so within the hospital environment. This responsibility is demonstrated by their
level of care, commitment to the continuing education requirement, 63 and the
financial burden of carrying malpractice insurance. 164
161. Stmtso v. Song, 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, 45, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1185 (1984); Funk v. Hancock, 26 Ohio App.
3d 107, 498 N.E.2d 490 (1985).
162. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
163. Physicians must complete 100 hours of continuing medical education every two years. Owo Ray. CoDs ArN.
§ 4731.281 (Page Supp. 1986).
164. The Physicians Insurance Company of Ohio (PICO) is the company that underwrites the Ohio State Medical
Association Medical Professional Liability Plan. This plan is available to Ohio physicians who are licensed by the Ohio
State Medical Board; are members of the Ohio State Medical Association; practice the majority of time in Ohio; and meet
the Plan's underwriting requirements. The physicians are divided into general risk classifications and the rates increase
accordingly with the risk. The following table demonstrates that even at group rates the financial burden of malpractice
insurance is high. Residents and first and second year practitioners do receive discounts. Physicians Insurance Company
of Ohio Brochure for Ohio State Medical Association (August 1985) (available from Ohio State Law Journal).
Primary Excess
$100,000/300,000 $1.2 million
Class I $1,967 $1,103
Class II 3,546 1,989
Class I1 6,150 3,449
Class IV 10,819 6,450
Class V 12,982 7,740
Class VI 17,310 10,319
Primary Excess
$200,000/600,000 $1.2 million
Class I $2,404 $918
Class 1n 4,334 1,655
Class IH 7,517 2,870
Class IV 13,096 5,090
Class V 15,715 6,107
Class VI 20,954 8,143
Claims Made Rates available upon request. Higher excess limits available with underlying
$200,000/$600,000 primary limit.
General Risk Classifications;
Class I
The following specialists who perform no surgery:
Family/General Practice Occupational Medicine
Allergy Ophthalmology
Cardiovascular Disease Otorhinolaryngology
Dermatology Pathology
Gastroenterology Pediatrics
Internal Medicine Pulmonary Diseases
Psychiatry Radiology (Diagnostic)
Gynecology
(Some minor surgical techniques performed in the office may be included in this classification.)
Class II
Specialists (see Class I list) performing minor surgery or surgical assistance on their own
patients.
Class Ill
Surgical specialists in the following (as well as physicians who perform surgical assistance on
other than their own patients):
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Patients injured through malpractice deserve redress, and redress is available. 165
But in attempting to hold hospitals liable for medical malpractice, the courts appear
to be establishing liability merely because insurance is available to hospitals. 166
Patients deserve the very best of care. Physicians are the professionals to whom
patients entrust their care. The very best of care is not furthered by holding hospitals
liable for physicians' independent actions which remain beyond a hospital's control.
Ruth Bope Dangel
Emergency Medicine Endocrinology
Radiology, with X-ray therapy Ophthalmology
Urology
Class IV
The following specialists in:
Anesthesiology General Surgery
Otorhinolaryngology Surgery Gynecological Surgery
Class V
Surgical Specialists in:
Obstetrics and Gynecology Hand
Plastic Head and Neck
Class VI
Surgical Specialists in:
Cardiovascular Disease Thoracic
Neurology Vascular
Orthopedics Trauma
(This is only a partial listing.)
Id.
165. See supra note 164, which addresses medical malpractice coverage.
166. The Ohio Supreme Court has expressed disdain for establishing hospital liability merely on the basis of the
presence of insurance. "We emphatically state that we are not imposing liability heretofore nonexistent merely because
it may be indemnified by insurance." Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467,475, 135 N.E.2d 410,415 (1956).
In addition, the prejudicial impact in a courtroom of evidence regarding a defendant's liability insurance is a legitimate
concern. Thus, "[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue of
whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully." Otuo R. Eve,. 411.

